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1. Forelrord
The Commissio'nrs proposed "Annuat Economic Report" for 1981-82
is submitted to the Community institrr.rtions in accordance with the CounciIts
1974 Decision (1) for attainment of a high degree of convergence of econo-
reic poticies sf,r.f{ember States. The Counqi I is required in the ,fourth .,
quarter of'each year - on proposal of the Cornnission and after conir,rLtingi
partianent and the Economic and Sociat Committee - to adopt an annuaL '
report on the.economic situation in the Commun-i"ty and to set economic
poticy gui'delines to be fottoned by each ftlember State-
, fs in previous years the Comrnission has atso prepared, as a sepa-
r:ate bac.kgr.ound dodument. to 'the,n'AnnuaI Ecor,tOmic' Reportrl, an "AnnuaI
Economic Revier'" rhich contains a more detailed factr.lat'ana[ys'is of eco-
nomic trends and the outtook for the yearl aheadl,:This secsnd docunent i.s
subrnitted to th€ Council, Partianent and Economic and Sociat,Corsmittee fo.f..:
i nformati on.
{
{h
(1) Artic[e]4 of Decision 7411?0/EEC of
Decision 751787lEEC oT 18 December
18 FebruarY '1974, anended
1975.
by
*\'
2. Retrospect and.prgEpects
1981 : digesting the.'second oiL shock with an unstabLe doLLar
even
of
the doL Lar
1 980
demand
(i)
*
It now seems LikeLy that the voLume. of output witL have been et best
of the same,order of magnitude in 1981 bs in 1980r.compared to the increase
of 016 % forecqst by the Commission a year ago in the Last AnnuaL Report (see
TabLe'1). The recession Lasted two quarters Longer than expected.
The most conspicuous contributing facton to these djffeirences between
forecast and out-turn has been the strong appfeciation of the US doLLar and
the reLated rise in worLd-wide'interest rates. The hypothesis behind Last
yearrs fonecasts incLuded some.appreciation of the US iJoLLar against the
ECU, but the 34'/, increase that has occurred in the tweLve months to
September 1981 was very much greater than expected. Interest nate decLines
had been expected for 1981.
As a .resu[t the Community's import pri ces are L ikely to r jse
faster in 1981 than in 1980 (6 1/?
trade Loss wiLL be greater too G %
revaLuation in 1981 t.ras on t}le same
(aLthough in.ether respects they are
and competitivity effects).
i( against 14 1/ 2 i4) , and its tenms
aga'inst 3 'l). In these respects,
scaLe as the second oiL shock in
quite different, for exampLe in
-broadLy what had been supposed in the fonecasts of a year ago. The exchange
rate movements have not entireLy prevented the Community from benefitting,
from the stabi;tisation of the oiL price : a weaker doLLar wouLd probabLy
aLso have weakened pressunes to stabiLise the nominaL o'iL price.
FolLowjng from the fast rising inport prices, consumen prices are
now forecast to grow. cons'iderabLy faster in 1981 than originaLLy expected
(11 13 %, companed to 9r7 %) in spite of the fact that wage incomes have
acceLenated onLy a LittLe. Thus thene was no overaLL progress.in redurc'ing
infLation'in 1981. The squeeze on househoLd jncomes resulted in a Low LeveL
cgnsumption compared to the ? % gain that .had been expected. Investment and
stockbuiLding performance atso were ueaker than expectedn infLuenced no
doubt by the very high intenest rates.
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Howeve1, the.mag,sivo improvement in the Communityrs internationaL
pllcr coftperlt.lv'lty rat.r EomG compcnsrt'lnE rw'ltch Jn demand w{th rxporti to
non-EC markets now [ikeLy to iricrease 4 1/? 7L for 1981 as a whole, compared
to the 2 1/i Z expected a year ago, In spjte of the worse terms of. trade,
t'he current dccount deficit for 1981 wiLL remain at a simiLar LeveL as in
1 980.
The Lowen-rate of activity, and acceIerating Iabour suppty, has
aLso raised the Leve[ of unempLoyment, but the 718Z rate now estimated
for 1981 as a whoLe exceeds the earLier forecast of 618 % by a wider marg'in
than might have been expected from historicaL output:empLoyment reLation-
ships
As regards poLicy performance, jt now seems Likety that money
suppLy wiLL haVe grown 11 % on average in the Community as a whoLe,
compared to the 9 % raf.e fgrecast for 1981 in the Last Annual Report. tllhiLe
Germany has kept r,,ithin its target range, other countries are tending to
exceed the nates of growth projecte.d in the Last Annual Report.
For budgetany poLicy, the.postponed recovery.has meant autornatic
tendencies for deficits to, rise, wfth weaker tax increases and higher
expend'itures - typicaILy for unempLoyment compensatjon and interest rates.
WhiLe it is estimated that these infLuences couLd have added about 1 1/? 7.
of GDp to the size of budget deficits, governmonts took steps to Ljmit this
ris"e through .restrictive action amounting to about 1 % of GDP, the average
def icit thus reaching 4r4 % of GDP, companed to the 3r9'/. expected in the
Last AnnuaL Report.
The European Monet6py System has continued to function satisfac-
toriLy. in 1980-81 in as much as, exchange rate variability has remained
substantiaLLy Lower than in the Last decade (se'e Tabte 2). The two
reaLignment-s in cbntral rates agreed on 22 March_ and 4 0ctober 1981 (see
TabLe 3) confirmed the abiLity of the system to make orderty adjustments in
accondance with frjndamentaL economjc criteria, whiLe preventing erratic
on irrationaL exchange rate movements.
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Flowever, the convergence of economic fr":ndanrentaLs has been. much
r,.ieak"€r, and i1i fact seri ougly inad,6QLrate" The divengence in in'ftation
tates (as measured by the standarcl devi ation of corrsumei' pni ce n'ises) has
.rjsen in 1980 and 1981 to an even higher LeveL than experienced in 1975-76
aftsr the first oiL shock, Budgetary pcfLicies have become increas'ingLy d'ivergent
(as aLso- i.ndicated 'in TabLe 2 by the standarcl deviatiein of Governmeni defie its
as a share af GDP) in 1980 and 1981, compared to the average for the pact
rJecacie, ancl'even more so compared to the njneteen-sixt'ies. t^,hiLe stri;cturaL
djfferences in budgets between countries are to be expectedr major differ-:,
ences in the response.of.budgetany poLicy to a shock such as the oil pr.ice
increases are difficuLt to reconcjte with the objectives of exchange rate
stab.iLity in the EMS. Dif f erences in the cjegree of absorption of the 'i"irst
oiL shock in reat wag.e LeveLs have stiLL persisted.
(ii) i9BZ. : P-IoqPect
1here are thnee major points to bean in rnind about the ou{Look for
the year ahead : the nature of the cycLicaL recovery that is likbLy to
deveLop between now and mid-1982, the nature of the major ilisks that hang
ovef this view of the short-term futune" and the nature of the ledium-lerm
path of ddvelopment which the Cemmunity economy may be on by the end of
1982.
A certajn cycLicaL recovery seems now to be beg'inning. The Commun-
ity's surveys of business opinion suggest this, aLthough the speed of the
upturn sti LL seems LikeLy to be moderate. Taking 1982 as 'ir whoLe ovot" 1981o
GDp should rise about 2 tr,with a somewhat'faster rate buiLding up in the course
of the year Q 1/2 7. - 3 D. Exports are expected to be the most dynamic
cjemand component (+ 6 7), -with domestic demand gror.ring onty 1 1/2 %" Consumer
price rises should deceLerate to about 10 1/2 % for the yean as a whoLe, and the
batance of payments curent def.icit narrot^l to Arq % of GDP. Money suppLy'
expansion may dbceLerate somewhat, whiLe public defjcits are expected on
the basis of budget pLans kno.wn to date to narrow on average sLightly to
4r1 T, of GDp.. UnempLoyment'is expected to stabiLise in the second haLf
of 1982 at a [eveL of about 8 1 /2 7,.
0f the many assumptions that have to be made ln any forecast, three
externaL factons are of evident'importance and unpredictabiLity: the price
of oiL, afid the interest rate'and exchange rate of the doLLar. For the price
of o'if , it seems tenabLe to assume that 'inlthe course of 198? its doLLar rate
wiLL not nise more than that of the oiL-exportersrimport prices' For interest
+
o
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Tabte 3 ''
Exchange. rate reaLfgnments in the Eul"opean f{onetary Systbm'in -1981
{}
Revatuation (+) or devaL-
uation (-) of biLateraL
centra t rates
Changes in eff,ective
exchange rates imPLied
in centraL rate changes (2)
DM
IlFL
DKR
FB/LUX
IRL
FF
LTT. :
(uKL) ( 1 )
0
0
0
-0
.0
t,*z:zrl>
+5 15
+5r 5
0
c
0
+1 
a4
+Ar6
+0r9'
+Or.6
tOr6
J
+1 r8
'6rA
?? t'larch 1981 4 october 1981 22 rtlarch 1981 4 October '19E1
?9rq)
+519
+317
-?,5
-f i8'
-1 14
-415
-4r9
-3
-3
0
-6
14\
'''Th" UK pound is included in the ECU, but not in the exchange'rate
mechanism of the EMS. For technicaL rea5ons, the, pound is'attri-
buted & n-otionaL centrat rate in the system. and at ebch of the
two nealignments this rate was brought into Li.ne with the market,
rate of the pound against a reference currency prevaiting on the
d.y' before the reatlgnments'bnip-. MarchnHFL, and:'oh 4 0ctober,DKR). .
tt'tfl:t?;l..u.rencies participatins in the exchinge rate mechanism of
*9.-
ne uncertain' The doL[arrates and exchange rated the outlook may be mot
retF. ln bOih 6dta! lrem donliasrrbly h'l€ner theh ihoUld bc exBcated on e
medium-tenm basis, but it js impossible to know when and how fast adj':t-.
ments may take pLace. The technicaL assumptions underLying the Commission's
forecasts incLude onLy a very partial regaining of ground of the ECU against
the doLLar in 1982, with some easing of us interest rates setting in from
the begjnn.ing of the year. The sharp weakening of the doLLar in Late september
is a reminder of how quickLy the internationaL monetary scenario can change'
^r^ | | 
- -Indeed, it is possibLe that both the oiL pr^ice and the doLLar couLd prove
weaker than noh, expected for 1982, in which case the Communityts baLance
of payments deficit couLd reduce faster, and the recoveny of domestic
demand pnove stronger. .
Beyond the.cycticaL recovery phase over the next tweLve months,
assuming that further d.amaging s.hocks can be avoided, Ljes the question
whether the Community economy wiLL have moved on onto a growth trajectory
that wouLd be both sustainabLe and sufficientLy strong to absorb unempLoy-
ment. The answer is Fy no means cL.ear. :The Last cycLicaL recovery (1978-
7% broke down aften two years of 3 1/2 % growth and had managed just to
stabiLiSe the unemp.Loyment LeveL over that pgriod. lrJhiLe the immediate
cause of the breakdown was the second oiL shock, it was aLso true that
physicaL'capacity utiL'isa!ion was high in many industriep, due to serious
under-investment. Thg evidence gives a rathen cLear warning that the
cycLicaL recoveny phase wiLL'have to be accompanied by fundamentaL changes
in the stnucturaL peiformance of the European economy and nequires consider-
abLe action on the part of 'the sociaL partners if it is to Lead to a reduc-
tion in unemPLoYment.
?
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3. An'outtl{re,-!.f- Lic the eomsrunit
.'].
. -':'-r' 5g:14ot:'lnes fOr eEenomte potisy ln the ComdTrlnlty'fOrn thr^ pprtpd
ahead',r$ay be def ined under three headings: ' ' ' ..
r$
icy lthat're[ate to the intennationa[
rnonetary environment ard foLl'ow from the Efts nealign'rment of 4 october
1g6:f. Beyond,.iluestions sf sontinuous.nanageaqtlt o.f' monetary polic]tr thts
concerns decisions fixinE..-budgets and, in severa[ cas€sr..'dom,estic mone-
tar.y paticy objrgctives ,for 1982z.andrgeneraL[yr negotiations over pay.
for the next contract Period;
(.ii}.horr,thefraneuorkofinstitutionsandgro.undru[esfqr.economic',
) reverse tendene ies .fbrpol.iicy need.ao '5e,.improvedl hotabty in order tc
the economies of ,flfemben'states to diverge in their financiaL poLicies ard
cost performance;,
(iii) hou the rCommunitY shouLd
mentaL 
.needs fon higher I'eve'[s
c reation.
'
tackLe over 6 period of Years
of inveEtment and comPetitive
its funda-
e;pfoynCht
3. (f) Imrnediate issues of poticv management foLLowing the 0ctober EtiS
reatignment
act of
it
Thd reaLignrnent of . EfilS centraL. rates af- 4 $ctob'er Has an
, sound man€gernent of the system. Shite the diVergences that caused
needlto be combatted, more effectivelyr the adjustqent hlas *u,tty in
Conformity,nith the ruLes of, the system; participating Eountries. 'remain":
wetL shier,ded as bethJe€n'thegrsbtves fro$ erratic or overshooting. exchange
rate movements. )for the period i'mmediatety- aheadr econonic poLicy nedds
to be adapted in txo Hays: 
, 
,,
1(a) the Community :ieeds to f ix on a ,strategy. capabte of navigating
successfuLLy through an extremeLy unsettLed inter:nationaL monetary
envi ronrnent,
(b) domestic poLicies for 1982 neqd to be. $et to maks a,success of the
exchange rate changes, and to set the Community on't6 a firmer recovery
path in the-.course of ,th€. next ye-ar. . '
{
The most f avou'l'abLe internationa L scerrario for the' months ahead,
frorn the US a$ i{*[t aa thq Europeat'i Fs'int of viarvy wpuld be ona jn llhich
US intere$t rates decLined subsfant,iaL.Ly against a background of decler-
ating infl,ation, ihe doLLar's exchange rate graduaLLy mcved back to a Less
high LerreL, and economic actjvity in the'US renained buoyant. In this
case/ European interest rates couLd aLso decLine" whiLe the Commuriity couLd
rnake rapid progress in reciucing its baLance ef payments t1eficit with a
boost to expcrt-oriented industry"
A Less favourabLe scenario wotrLd be one in which the doLLar weak-
ened snarpLy lrhiLe US jntirrest rates remained high aLongside a weakening
in economic ac't'ivity. In the very recent past, some trends have been
mone of this Kind. If th'is scenar.io deepened, the Cornmunl'ty wouLd'need,
ancl perhaps t"touLd have an opportunity, to disconnect jts nonetary condi-
tions fnom those prevaiLing in the US. In particuLar, the Community
rnight wish to dampen an unduLy sharp doLLar exchange nate faLL with a
reduct'ion in European interest rates, opening up - at Least for. the Lou-
infLation countries in Europe - an interest rate di'fferentiaL vis A vis
the United States with Lower nates in Europe. If combinecj with a moderate
hardening of European exchange ratesr. this jnterest rate decLine couLd
be compatibLe with improved pi^ice stabiLisation and a centinued strength-
ening export performance in worLd markets. Thus in the second scenario
aLso, there is a possibLe short-run strategy for Europelth"t=eouLd Lead
to a strengthening economid recovery'
The Community,should aLso be making construct'ive suggestions to
its majon panrners in the industriaLised worLd f,or a more cooperative
management of the major internationaL monetary variabtes.
omesti cTo make a successfuL strategy for 198? requires that d
policies be set in the Community in a t"lay that supports these eLements of
externaL policy and is also coherent as between Member States in the
Light of the EMS reaLignnent and the need for betten convergence.
To do this in pn-actise is a highly compLex matter, and one that
necessarity invoLves controversia[ !ssues. The key decisions are being made
in"the setr of draft- budgets for 1982 some of which are alneady before
nationaL parLiaments, in fixing targets for domestic monetary aggregates
for 1982 in the course of the autumn in some of the Larger Member States,
and in the forthcoming negotiation of principaI wage contracts for the period
I
i
II
*
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afreadi * in 80ms,d88€s qfinucl 88 in gernreny; in .ssme cf,scg for uB to thfac
yearsra.s in ltaLy.' The c6mplexity fottows f rom the faci that in the optimaL'
Conmunity pot i cy these three rnain decision-making variabLes .- budgetsT frooe/.'
and ;incomes - have to be set consistentLy inter 'se within countries. as ueL-L
as between countries. Moreover there are severaL types. of institutions '
rinvo[yed in these thr-ee domains, and understandab[y so (the fottowing section
returns' to institutionaL questions).
, The first particularity of. the outLbok for 198? is the.acute
.interreLationship,between budget ahd rnon'etary poLicy. The sensitivity of
intecest rates to budget poLicy variabtes is a[most certainLy mvch stronger
no,1,1 t,han at any time in the paSt. A budget po[icy aLLouing the deficit to
rise is LikeLy now.to,bq reLativeLy heaviLy offset in its stimutative eff,ects
oo-€cofto$ic actjvity by increasing, interesi rates; conversely"budget poLicy
action to reduee deficits is tikeLy to be consider:abty offset in its
contract'ionary effects by faLting interest rates. Moreover this seems
to hoLd for alL llember':states, ra4ging.f rom Genmany uhose econony is the
disequiLibrated, through Erance whose budget. deficit hps been the Lowest
in the Community in recent times, to the severaL countries whose deficits
are not"l around oi in excess of 10 Z of GDp.
The second particularity is the need to foLLow thnough the EMS
neaIignmdnt uith internaL, poLicy adjustments. Fon reVaLuing countnies,
stabiL'isation policy'is strengthened, the prospects for interest. reductions
are improved and thence should follow a support for the reaL economy. The
Uxr
L east
devaLuing countnies, should expLoit 16s gppof'llnit-y n_ob, to make a more
napid.externa{ adjustment, which reguires that.!hey irrtensify efforts to
avoid cost increases, that budgetany poLicy be ncontroLLed more stnictLy,
and that monetary poLicy be managed so as.to maintain durabLy the neul
centra L rates. ,I
,In the pnesent iircumstancesr. tld probabLe reduction in the German
budget deficit could contribute significantLy to a reduction in German
, : .1inter:est 
.rates, which are exceptionat [y high 'in neaL terms (+7 7, f or
short-term rates). The size of the irnpact on interest rates, whiLe diffi-
cult to quantify, coutd,be especiaLly import'ant because of the inSernationaL
monetary context aLready discussed. .A mark'ed recovery in international
market confidence in the capac'ity of the German economy to adjust success-
fuLLy to the energy shock and competition in worLd markets uou[d.'make
possjbLe a movqment back towards. S/DM interest rate differentiats
that reftect reLative infLation performance.
*13.-
The German money market is a fuLcrum between internationaL monetary
conditions and those prevaiLing domesticaLLy within most Member States, and
notabIy those in EMS 
"countries. If German interest rates decLine substantiaLly,
the rates in most Member States shoutd be abLe to fo[Low. In this way a
rigorous German budgetary poLicy may be seen as Leading to overatt financiaL
conditions favourabLe to the business upsr"ring and empLoyment in the rest of :
Europe; it can fit positiveLy into a concerted strategy.for the Community.
But for this to bd the case there are stiLL further conditions to
be fuLfi L Led:
(i) avoidance of roverkiLL' 'in pubtic finance stabiIisation, and
(ii) convergence in the approach of aLt Member States, which neans consistent,
-but not identicaL poLicy adjustments.
The danger of 'overkiLLr Lies in creating recessionary circLes of
'cause and effect between budgetary action which reduce$ demand and thence
a weaker LeveL of activity which automaticaLLy..increasgs the budget deficit
again, so Leading to a net.l round of restrictive actton,in order to adhere
l to fixed targets for the budget baLance. ALmost invariably action to reduce
budget deficits wiLt have some demand contractionary effect, but
this may be offset by monetary and externaL demand effects. The
risks of a .recession are great when the budgetary action is excessiveLy
heavy in reLation-to the desired interest rate reduction, or when it is
accompan'ied by a serious overvaLuation of the exchange rate, or cost ln-
creases that make the economy uncompetitive. Thus judgements on whether
restrictjve budget poLicy actions are tdefLationaryr are not simpLe. Much
depends on the monetary context, and on whether the sociaL partners support
or defy poIicies of stabiLisation and adjustment in their income settLements.
The United Kingdom f s the major exampLe of a fvlember State.which has experienced
' a more serious recession since the second oiL shock compar^dd to the first,
and this seems to be due to the combination of rigorous financial policies
with a preparedness to Let the Pound fLoat outside the EMS and the fact that
empLoyers and trade unions did not adapt quickLy to the financiaL stabiLisation
poLicies.
Convergence in the approach of Member
,is necessary if aLl are to benefit from the
arc desired. If not, the benefits witL be at
Statqs towards budgetary poLicy
inter-.€st rate reductions that
best uneven Iy cji st r".'ibuted" and
t3
b,orse I the *hoLe strategv riskr being distali t.isedr tnt:t-::t: ::t":tn ,
creqting reneued exchange rate tensions. In .the case of the Nethertands' t
proposed 1'982 budget wouLd app€ar to be rather convergent on the German
t aL^.--
strategy 'aq regards.the budget batancel atthough taxatjon and pubLic e-xpen-r
diture teveLs .rerfiain's very mueh, higher in the Dutch case' In.1981 seriousty
divergent trends urere sden in BeLgium, Denmark, tr'etanl inO 
tt::: 
"t,::0n".
def .icits attained {.evels that uere f undamentat Ly out of Line r+ith poticy
either in Germany or.the average of the comnrunity. In 1982 budget poticy
shouLd ih these countri€s, at least begin to. return towards more average , .
b
he
Conmun'ity nagnitudes. ,The.draft budgets,'so far pubtished are,hardty more t-han
fiist .steps inlthis direction. In na circumstahces shsutd the goverltnents
tet these level"s be surpassed, as in fact happened in 1981 in rel'ation:to
the initiatLy tangeted teveLs;0n the contrary, the realignment now makes
itpossibIetoenvisagemoreambibiouSbudgetcon-solidatjontargets.
France is in a particutar situation: in 1980 it was the onty country to
have a negtisible :buOget batance- ::":" .then its 
def icit .has',b:"" ]:.rea-
si.ngquiterap.idLy,.butthedraft1982budgetdefiiit.rema,ins.be[ot"rthe^
Community a\rerage as'a shar"'it ,gOF. If the ba1ance of payments a1d inf tation
1Jere in a simitaity relativeLy favourabte condition, this poLicy uoUtd be
,without serious risks. Sihce this is not the case, as the realignment has
r,rnd'ertine.d, the governtnent must controt very canefult)r the extent of its
budget pol,icy change. fYloreover, the reatignment now permits exports to
take over some of the demand stimutus initialLy envisaged for the 1982
r budgetr; '
n
' W'ithin 
,lh" structur'e of budgets adopted for 198?, a co{nmon o*:ot,ttt-tor aLI flernber Sta.tas. is to f ind room for. rFcessary experxCitur€ on emptoyment
progranmeli 
"nd for: the stirnulation of invesltment. 
' In o,rderr.to respe€t :
overatt fipanciat constraints, thig uiLL require chqnges in ex'isting ?tog-
rammes of 'current pubtic expenditure. Important changes can be made without
weakening. vitaL pubtic serv'ices, For exampLe, the demographie changes at
present underuay mean that resources shon[d be thifted from schooting.to :
voc,ationat traintrc as the rbutge generationr advances. Howeverr.sOeJaL
security burJgets need to.be examined with a view to containing their growtht
ne-examining their methods of financirig.and re-inforcing the efficiency of
thej r eoverage.
t),-
* In rrttlnd monntarl, trl.Ectr'fer 1pAZ, rhrrt lr rcope fEr tmprsu-
ing the degnee of prior consuLtation within the commutnity, before the
ientrat banks decide their poL'icies in fuLL conformity with thein nationaL
institutionaI positions. rn 1981, jt seems LikeLy that many centraI banks,
with the exception of the Bundesbank, wjLL overshoot their targeted rates
of monetary on credit expansion, or the rates forecast by the Commission
in Last yearrs AnnuaI Economic Review. For 1982 the monetary aggregates must
be controlLed within Iimits that wiLL favoun a distinct Louering of the rate
of infLation, which in turn woutd aid the Lowering of nominaL interest
rates without endangening the nehi EMs central nates.
There is a consensus in the Community over the need to act urgentLy
and decisiveLy to reduce unempLoyment"The right financiaL stnat"gy riri
heLp' Direct Labour' manket measures need to be intensified tdithin this
financiaL strategy, and these are further discussed beLpw. The experience
of Germany aften the finst oiL shock, and of Japan ror"trecentLy, both
show how a rapid and major adaptation of Labour costs tg the n""0, of.
new situation can enabLe majon economic difficuLties tolue overcome
rn the present situat'ion, Europe, has become much more competjtive because
of the combination of exchange rate changes externaLly against the doItarand yen, and internaILy within the EMS. This presents an enonmous oppor_tunity for European industry, and emp[oyment creation. gut it''r, o."riselyin the next pay negotiations that the sociaL partners.wiLt have to decidewhether to confirm this improved competitive 
,"a."ar"|.r:"rO".a'the sametime heLp inf[ation and interest rates to come down; to do so requiresaccepting neaI pay increases substantiaLty beIow tne gr""an-"r'rr"or.ar"_ity untit the economy is returned toa radicaLty nigner inu"rtr"nt 
"nO 9.o"tnperformance.
}
t
J. (il) ovsrcerning ob[taetec tg t barltr convtrgenca of nonltlry ln(l
budgetany, p,gIi,c ijrs and incorytes
A cosnbitation of cpnvergence in nominaL exchange rates. but divergence
in budgetarye price and, cost developments, has devetoped over the past ttro
years. These coqtradietions can b'e sustained for some timer.but onty st the
cost of increasing economic distorti'ons, such as uidening balance of payments,
inbatances and rising reaI interest rates in countries with high budget
defic,its or atteotpfs to controL capital move&ents. Bqt dt sorne stage they
must be offset by exchange rate changes, as recent experience confirmed.
t-'
The Lack of b6Lanced'progress
Commission, in its Comrnunication of 1
programnes of econornic adjusiment in
urgently' r.equired pubLic finance and
generaL Communication xas foItoued up
of jndex,ation, and twq Rgcommendations
in -stabilisation potic:r. a,[ready ted the
Juty to argue in favour of acceterated
'severaL countries, rith fhe emphasis on
income stabiLisation measuFes. This
urith a Comnunication on the principIes
on economic policy in Betgium and ltaty.
i
s
. There js considerabLe agree-tnen! on the need to sppport cofEnon
monetary stabiLisation efforts with convefgence in budgdtary poticy and
.. :income trends. This being so, it is necbssary to give gleater attentiori
to horol -institr.rtionaL or. even manageriaL factot's affect the reactions of
the economy to events that can induce the divergence: process, notabty
the reactrons of (a)'employers and erployees to d' pricti shock ,in their'pay
negotiations; (b) tlae monetary authonities t<i demands for increased credit;
and (c). the budgetary authoritfqs.to tendenc'ies for resuLts.to deviate
from initia[.pLans.
As regards pay, the systems prevaiting in the Cornmunity range from
those in which thd wage bargain is fixed in nominaL terms for at'Least' ,
a year; to those in which an indexation mechanism autombticaLLy palses
prices through into trages within as [,ittte as two.months deLay'
0n t'he issue
Last yea'r i ndi'cates
of indexation the AnnuaL Report 'adopt,ed.by the CounciI
the hi,gh degree of conEensus amohlg gqvernments on the
need to avoid_passing thrqugh the oiL priGe'increases jnto incomes. Some
countries acc;s:omed to in<rexation have taken some steps to Limit'its auto-
matic pass-thiough of oiI prices and indirect tax increases (l{etherLands,
:.
L
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Dennark)" Sut'in ether eountries axist'ing practicss have not ehangeii t+;ee
the commission's Recommendations tc fieL,g:iurn aniJ tr.taLy) " Ihere'f ore tilic.
Commission -foli"ourecj up on the conc,ern expressed'by the European Counci l- in
i''iarch uith a generaL Commun.icaiion that ccnctudes orr four main points:
*
(i )
(i i )
,.:;.:\
(iv)
blhere tlne principLe'of wage indexation is accept'ed, "the regutation
-index shouLd exc Lude the 'irnpact of f a"ctors outside corporate controL
(terms of trade, indirect taxation etc");
urage acijustments shoul<j ont^y he made uith delay, and not mone than
twice a year;
uhere the infLation nate'is apprec'iabLy'above the Commun'ity average,,
the airn shouLd be to Linnit indexation to an agreecl rai-e, for example to
the Cornmunity average -irrfLation ra'[e;
a simpLe and ternpor€ry tecliniqule- for adapting to an inflationary
shock couLd be to forego entireLy a certain number of indexation
ad j us tment s .
*
' I'he urgency of ac't'ion aLong fhese Ljnes -is now'intensi'tied toLLowing
the EMS rea.Lignment.
As regarcJs monetary poLicy, the range of poL.icy reactions is
between the'case in urfrich the rn{f,netary authorities commit t-hernselves
to rtomina l tarEets, arid ane expecte.d Lo act to aChere to them" anc.l the
case in which the n.ronetary authoritjes could - orr past performanr:e *
be rnore expected to supply reLief to ent_erprises in ditficul"ty or
fjrlancing to tl're govennment where marke't conditions Liecome cliff.icuLt.
ProbLems of rjivergent monetary policy have so far been reLatively Ljmitetj
to the exLent that the nnembers o'f the EltlS who were before rnembers of
the snake have accepted the required monetary discipline. Thus the
probl-ems among these countries are nlore often those arising from the
combinat'ion of effect'iv.e rnonetai^y control and ineffective efforts at pqy
moderation ancl budgetary controt. But there are aLso exampLes jn tlre
Commun'ity where the clperating respons'rbi Lities of the monetary authoiit jes
need to be cl-arified' feir exarnple jn Greece".In.Italy certain reforms are
now being impLemented. f4oreover in the period ahead there is the need Lo
prevenr the erosion of noneLary discipt jnes ma jntairred r,ntiL new (Fl.ance) 
"
nq
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Aercgerld€'huddetarytrs|.icy*thefeet$ristgadjn6todivergent".
resuLts are the inost complex. .The variahLes hene are (a) the speed tlilft whi ch 
--. 
'
the;essentiaL statist'ics become ivailabLe (b).the manageriaL capacity of
the.budgetsystemtocont':QLover-runso(c)the|egisLativeprocedures.for
controL, and adjustmentr 
-and -(dl) -the wi LLingness of the polit'icat authority / 
t,
to rnark out cLearLy its 'budgetary objectives 'and give. cn€dib,i Lity to them :
rn'pract'ise over the past yea?, a major issue has been .that of judging t U
when the so-called "automatic stabiLisers" needed to be resisted with I I
offsett'rng expendiiure cuts or LegisLat'ive, changes' The normative quaLities
of th1s term need-correcting for courrtries whose starting position is one of . ;
serious financia-t disequitibrium, for exampLe, countr.ies with very large pub- :
Lic def icits. (Belgiurnr. Denmarkr'ItaLyr. trreLand). The presumpti<in Should :
rather..bethateconomiesHithh.ighpubLicdefi.citsarePronetobeinggraveLy.
destab'iLised, especialLy t*hen Large defici'ts are associated with high 
.-.
infLation or lyig! qeat interest rates. The dangers inhei'ent jn the "auto-
matic destabilisers'n;, pnC notabLy the speetJ and ease urith which a budgetary
cjefjcjthavebeeriseenr.ecentLytosL;deoutof,ccnt!:oLuptoenormous:
nragnitudes, unrje,-Lines the priority that severaL countries neec'l g'ive'to
ref orming ihei y. systems cf br-lrJget cgntr*l" Indeed, the fq:ur countn,ies fri
mentiosedo wh,:se publii defiei.ts have nghf reached" Or afe olcse tO, ffi U
of 'GDF' ars n*iit maseivellr,out of Line wi"tii the c\Verage of the Commun.itys
{r
il
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, The rise in the ratc of unemBtoyment to 8% is now the most
dremat{c of the Communityrs economic pnobLems. The weakness of {ts
investment performance, which has faLlen about 2'l as a share. of GDP in
the yeari since the first oiL shock, compared to the five years pre-
ceding it, and the rise in the cate of demographic increase in the
Labour force to near Ly 1 %, per year, points to the magnitude of the
task of creating new jobs for a Lange fraction of those now unemployed.
These probLems are at the core of the proposed fifth medium term programme
for 1981-1985 which the commission sent to the counciL in Jury(1).
The reduction of unempLoyment in the community cannot satis-
factoriLy be achr'eved. without a massive renewaL and expansion of the
stock of productive capitaL. lrrhi Le neIativety high rates of interest
over a medium-term period may induce some heLpfut substitution of
Labour fon capitaL, the strategy that the community shouLd foLLow stitL
nequires investment in new equipment. The onLy industriaL stnateg!, that
can go with a weak investment performance is one which consists ofIJ I J S
down-gnad'ing productivity, technoLogicat qual.ity and income LeveLs
reLative to internationaI competitors; this is not a strategy upon
which the Community wfshes to conv-erge.
The chaLlenge of buiLding-up employment and investment invoLves
the use bf severaI instruments oflpoLicy and severaI indirecttpre-
requisites of success, because of the impontance of a favourable cLimatefor investment for the success of such a strateg y(?) 
.
A first'fundamentaL factor, the cost of Labour in reLation to that
of compet'itors, has been considerabLy transformed over the past year
as a resuLt of the.depneiiation of the ECU against the do[lar and the.yen- Thus the communityrs average unit tabour costs (reLative to its
competitors, expressed in doLLars) is [ikeLy to decLine 1 4 1/? i( in1981. as against increases of 14 i( for the US and 10 1/Z % for Japan(see Tabte 14).The cornrnunity must for the time being take the opportunityto achieve a rapid batance of p.ayments adjustment. To this end, the in-
creased competitivity of the community's producers must," ;;;;.;;;_;into a.apid expansion of saLes to regain tost rnarket shares
+
"'In* conipLete texts' and reLated
,_.,tiio{:orlx N" 9, July 19g1 anaLys,es .are pubIished in _*iggggt
'r nvestment
{?) 
-.see ftsr'e,,,rorcl to the \rth Frogr amne, and Energy.and Research docurnents
. !^. .'
CommunitY and on third
buiLd-up ln the ri'olirme
investment to increase
resuLts takes severat
markets. Ine reased sa Les tnugt'.nbu
of prof{ts, and then loed on to a
capacity and emp[oyment. This fuLt
years to buiLd up
I lor is the cost and avaiLabiLity ofA Second,fundarmntaI factolis, sf,
qaoitat. to aChieve a'reductioni on. average in :n" :::" "t l::-::": l:
ofvitatirnportanceforstimutatinginvestment,br'rtthiscannotbedo1e
I rates of interest' for /simpl.y nor by deciee. As regards ve{y high rea
exampLe of the brd,er of 5 to d x in som-e countriei'(notabLy Betgiutltr :
D.ennark, Ger.many and the Nether:tands)r. cgmpared toithe long-tert "*f"g'
of.about21|2Z,thesemust,-be.reducedsubstantiattyfonastrong
iovestment p'erformance to ake, root' ReLief t"t* ,:,:f1,:::1 :ith 
reat 
- 
, 
,
rates shouLd in'the f,irst instance cone from an adjustment to more normal
'intennationlt monetary colditions, 6ug ior sone Community countries it riLt
requi re st ronger act'ion to ,reduce budge't def i c i ts '. '
Houevgr, unduLy, Lou'or even negative reat
be a sound prescription for investment and'grou?h.
needs to be strengthened, and increased resour€es
lrrisk-bearing private uses - cornpared to government
dominate many capitat markets.
Governments should be examlning ,the case for a{aptilg nutes gov'-
erniqO business taxat.ion, 
-capitat markets, and aids affectinE investment
and savings. ''The inftationary environment in addition creates geriotts
pnobLems for adequate capitaL cost evatuation and effi.ciency of incentive
se"herps and tai regines, For exardpte, where profitabitity'is Low or even .
negative and the prospects ane depressed, the vatue of any investment
in'centit* is iorrespondingLy weakened, especiaLl.y those of -deireciation
.'--"--: (
aLLowances.. As infIation has inereased, the incdntivg vatue of deBresiation
at [owances has iect ined"' I{oreover, inf tation and [ow prof itabi ['ity have tended
70.-
.assLlre a
nril $!va. al
cyc Le of
'natgs of, intefest. cannot
Savlngs :performance
must rbe. channe[Led into
bonds uhich at Preient
tF,
T
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to r€duce ths avaiLab'iLity of.ri*k eapitat requined for jncreasing empLoy-
ment" poLicy tot*ards investment, aids is too complex a subject; and too
valied between countriesr to aLLow simpLe generaLisations" Two propc-
sitions, nonetheLess, woutd seem to hoLd.FirstLyrg'iven the present prio.rity
need to indqce a massive neld bu'iLd-up of investment, the IeveL of financiaL
incentive towards capitaL fonmation. and innovation shouLd be maintained
in reaL terms if not increased. But secondly, experience has shown that
muLtipLe systems of'aids directed at different poLicy objectives
can become contradictory and cost-ineffective. Economies in obtaining
betten value for'nroney in investment aids rbmains a promising pursu'it
for the authorities concerned.
The reduction of unempLoyment must come essentiaLLy from job
creation in new growth industridq and service sectors. In many df the
newest and promising 'industries.- microeLectronics for exampLe - the
Communityrs world position is not as strong as it should be, To buiLd upjts new jndustriat base the enterprises, governments and Community heve
to Hork together in a comprehensive strategy/'invoLving research and
deveLopment, corporate organisationrcommerciaL and pubLic procurement poLicies.
There are atready exampLes of. success, with the Airbus winning back substantiaL
worLd. market shares in its segment of the aerospace 'industry. The .Community
must give the highest priority to stimuLating the capacity of European
industry to become a major worLd force in the principaL advanced techno-
Log'ies of the decades ahead. '
In industriaL poL'icy the Community has to make up what'individuaL
Member States alohe cannot achieve by comparison wilh:he United States and
Japan. :Ihe exp[oitdtion of Europe'scontinentaL dimension shouLd not
'\
necessari Ly reLy on pubLic intervention at the Community LeveL'. However,
aLL the Communityts neLevant poL jcy responsibi tities shouLd be turn,.-d
to faci Litating this process. First the openess of the internaL market
needs further to be improved. Second.Ly, the use of.state aids must be con*
troLled to preveint segmentation of' the marke!. ind nationaL discrjmination.
ThirdLy, the Community shouLd act whenever necessary to stimutate the
formalion of an advanced European industriaL capacity. FourthLy, the
Community's own financing poss'ibiLities shouLd continue to buiLa up
support for investment and structunaL adaptation in the areas of accepted
Com;runii), prioritjes. This concerns both Loan funds and the structural
D
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funds sf, the Community budget whoca,poIi'cied are] at present undbr: revieu. n
of small
access to
the appropriate :r
(i)
The i'comrnunity shouLd fuirthermore gncourage lthe devetopment
and medium-sized enterprises, in part by facititating their
Coqrrnunity .f inance throuth the technique of gLobal. Loans to
f'tnanciaL intermediaries. r "
Many detaiLed initiatives ?r" now bqing taken in Member States ;
to hetp'the pno€ess of smaLl. scaLb empLoyment ereation. Thig .we[come trend
shou[d iaie aceount of the contribirtJdn that'di.ifenent types of entenprises,
"_::)
incLudfng coop'erativesr' can make in creatihg jobs, par.ticu[ar[y through the? -.
exptoitation-.ot..tocat :economic protentiat, therreby opening tp important scope
I
.for.more f{.exi'b[e adaptation of the economy to rneet markgt opportunities.
f
l
:.r
1
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:The needs for a strohger 'Community' eneFgy' pot icy- provide a vitaL
-component of the strategy for buiLdirg up,investment.and- empfoyment.
,n campr,ehensive outLine of r*hat coutd nou be done, has'been, propos-ed : .
recently in ? Qg'mmissjon'Conrnunication ftThe 0evgtopment of an Energy
,s'tratggy for the Community"(c0Mtbt'>S+6; 23 September. 1,981). . Five iirain - {
priorities for action by the Community are suggested:
ensuring an adequate [evet of investment both in aLternatives to
oiL bnd' iri.,the mope rational use of 'energy. Forecasts for ehergy-
reLated investment suggqst that ils volume wiLt'rise from around ,
7r6,'i of GDP now to' lr? i4 on average fsrt'the present decade,
which uoul.d reprresbnt ;9 - 10 % of tota[ tnvestmentr imptying:\
expenditur:e of some 500 biLIion ECUs, The Cgmmibsion has doubts
whether these forecasts can be abhieved without"neu act'ion wi:thin .
the Community, But even if they.were achieved, the Level of
energf investment" wouLd, stiLL onty-bmount to aboi.rt' hatf the;.
.effart of the United States and twooth'irds that of Japan (in
ca3es measured in t:he basis'of energy investment es a share
GDP) .
reLatlve
att
of
.\/
(ii) the deveLopment ol a comrnon approach to energy price and taxation-
In the Lattel field the Commission has madb moFe detajled propos-
aLs in a Communication on the lfTa;ation'of 0it Products" (COm(81)511,
glseptember- 1981)7. susgest.ing prlin.ipLes for a ioordinated ' S
apprbach involving,thg setting of target zones.'for tax pressure . :
-"1"n-,. ,, ,
?3.-
on the ma jn oi L products, ancl principles for the el. iminat jon of
exernptlons, subsiclies or recjuced ratee for specJfl* usens- A
constructive use of energy tax instruments could be one of the most
por.ierfuL possible poLicy actions to induce the economy to make
empLoynrent-jntensive investment. 
,
(jij) the estabLishment of credibLe mqasures for sub-crisis management
for oiL supPLY in the CommunitY-
(iv) the reinforcement of common poLicies in the fieLds of research,
deveLopment and technoLogicaL demonstration"
(v) the further deveLopment of comnron initiatives in externaL energy
reLations, especiaLLy in reLation to the deveLoping worLd.
It wiit t"ke time for the fundamentaL.economic remedies to
unempLoyment to bu'iLd up thei r ef f ects
a start has bee rmmunity towards buiLdingHoweven, St een made in the Cc
up recognit:ign of the scope lor a common and constructive approach"
ng!abLy at t5e jo.int CounciL meeting of Finanee arrd SociaL rninisters in
June of this yc.ar, The ccncLusions cf the Presidency at that meet'ing
accorcied with the vieus of 
.the:tomm]ssion that a comprehdnsi.ve poLicy
i.esponse is requirecj to the twin chaLLenges of reciucing infLation and
unenpLoyment. Tfrere is agreement fOr eXatnpLe on the need- to pursue
empLoymelt expansion in areas of technoLogicaL inrrovation and the energy
sectorr- and smaLi. scaLe job creatir:n" The. f inanciaL br-rrden pIaceci on empLoyers
by particuLar met-hods of f inancinE :ntj.L.security neeus to hre revl'ewe;lt,an'd
a more transparent and coherent anaLysis is'needed of thre impact of pubLic
expencliture on empLoyraent and growth. There js aLso agreement on the need
for direct actions to ease unempLoyment
hJjth regard, to the particuLarLy acute probLem of youth unemptoy-
R.ient, the Commission has carried the debate a step further in proposing
a, comrnon oh jective in iti fore*-ord to the f i fth medium:term programme:
settingUp,overthefiveyearsaheadmachinehyandarranEementStc
ensure that, on Leaving schoo[, aLL'ysung peopLe obtain either a pa'id
job or access to a vocatir:naL trairiing course or b1()th together" The
CounciL is invited to adopt this objective and :
*
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(i) , to compare nationaL experiences in this fieLd;
(i i ) reciui re natisnat' prograrnmee be
dat e;
(iii) decide on par'tiat funding for
Fr.rnd;
(iv) provide for the examina!ibn of
submitted tc'the
such schernes. from
resuLts achieved
i4..-
eommunity by a given
the European SociaL
at reguLbr intervaLs.
. The a.daptati,on of working time. can aLgo heLp e6se the problem of
unempl6yment, whiLe matching socia[ dernahds for more fLexibLe work arrange-
ments - for exampLe part-time work, earLy retirement etc. However, great
care has to be taken to avoid changes in wor.king cohditions'that coul.d
risk significant[y inereasing hourLy Labour or capitaI costs, and tg
avoid shanpLy deviating trends as between Member States especiaLLy in
urays which woutd risk affecti4g competitive conditions.
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' 4n Economic policy in the Member States
'l
The economic situation lias deteriorated in gglg.igin 19Bi : the
faLL in the Level of economic activity and empLoyment has been accompanied
by an acceLeration of consumer price infLation and a deterioration in the
current account of the balance of payments.
The Commission of the European Communities considered this situation
one of great concern and, on ?? Juty lgSlraddressed a .recommendation to the'
BeLg'ian..government which advocated corrective measures. to be taken in the
monetary, budg'etary and revenue fieLdi,
. 
GujdeLines were adopted by the beLgian authorities, at the beginn'ing
of the month of August 1981;in estabLishing the centraL government budget
for lgilZrwhich effectiveLy took account of the Limit tor 1982ron the current
account budget deficit oi 200 biLLion FB, requested by the Commission. The
afrangements shouLd.make it possibLe to reduce the borrowing re'quirement of
generaL governmentras a percentage of gross domestic productotron 1515 % in
1982 to 13,5 % in 1982.
The most recent jnforma-tiol concerning the execution of the 1981 BucJget
sugEests that net borrowing wiLL be significantty above the provisionaL estimates
made in the middLe of the year. In othen respects the guide[ines adopted by
onitios have I pd f taxai'ion andthe belgian authoritie   Led to an increase in the burden o'
Less restraint on expenditure,{han the Commission recommendation suggested.
Under these conditionsrthe management.of the budsel in 1982, if it is
to adhere to the.Limits qnd priorities indicated aboverwiL'l have to aim at
strictLy contain'ing expend'iture, and to be impLemented with suffic'ient
fLexibiLity to permit compensatory adjustments wjthin the overalL budget.
;
In other respects, poLiti caL events
foLLow through the diaLogue established with the
income moderation and the possibLe reLaxation of
incomesras suggested by the Commission,
have not made it possible to
sociaL partners concerning
the indexation of certain
It is in the interests of a Lasting irnprovement in the empLoyment
sjtuation, that a renewaL of neggtiations shouLd r:apidLy Lead to concrete
resuLts.
I
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recovery'in gr.owth, is pi'inCipaLLy determine.d as much by the restructuring
of productive potentiaL, .requiring strong investment grobltht as by a Lgwering
of costs reLative to major competitOrrs. The adjUstment of the centraL rates of
the European monetary"system, decide-d on 4 october 1981, does not diminish the
that the essentiaL adjustments must take pLace rithin the BeLgian economy'
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const.ruct i On, Economi c act i vi ty theref one s [owed down, push i ng unemp Lo,yment
in1981to8,2Xofthe'-|"abourforce.
iheouttookfor1982.'indicatesad.istinctlupturnineconomic
d confirmsactivity (t'he yeai-on-year groyth of GDP.coutd welt be 3 7) an
the need to continue with a.tigh! financiat poticy as envisaged by the
mutti-annua[programmeadoptedattheendof1979.Budgetary
poLicymustcometogripsujthvariousprob.|.emsthatgivecauseforcon-
cern nameLy the increase in expenditure made to Fombat, unernBLoyment, the '
,jp.urg", in pu.bLi c debt interest. and thd stuggi shness of tax receipts :
associated wjth sLack economic activity. The centrat government borrowing
requ'irement, which has increased from DKR 17 900 mittiqn in 1980 to DKR
31 900 miLLion, i1 1981, i.e- from 4,8 t to.7r9 Z respedtivety of gross
domestic product, is Likety, accordinl to the draft budget, to reach
DKR 3i 900 nitlion, or 8rB X of GDP. A deficit Of this, size is'becoming
more and more difficutt to finance" and the resutting cpst'of debt ser-
vicing w'itt tenA increasingLy to aggravate tfe budget sitdation" A possi.bLe
.fur.ther increase in the budget deficit uoutd seriousl-y endanger the resto- -
rafion of extennat equiLibrium. The authorities shou[d strictLy respect
the expendiuure targets adopied under the mutti-annueI progrjmne and do
their utmost whiLe impLementing the 1982 budget so as to avoid an increase
in the presentLy forecast deficit even if economic conditions shouLd be
defic.it appr€ciabLy despit'e the
trade and the heavier costs of
reftects a gain in competitive
sLackening of dornestic demand;
t.lorse than foreseen.
The need to finance greaier
and to attrait foreign capitaL in order
me.ans that monetary poticy has singular
.".1...
In 1980 nnd'??81 P,eftlpr\ Euc€dsdsd 'ln cuttlng thc curr.nt account lF
pronounced deterrjor:ation in ihe terml of
servi cihg the'externaL debt. The improvement
edge, but it was achieved at the cost of a
notabLy Bt'ivate consumption and residentiaL
pubLic sector borrowirrE requirements
to'cover the current account def ic'it"
Ly,tittte room for manoeuvre. In tine
5
Iii'l-
,
jn
3 r.,{th 1tl praBant
L i qui di ty 
.under
n'r gn !eve L.
rtahcre 'lt chouLd nant{nur to herp ths
strict controL, and to'maintain interest
greilth ol do|llartlc
rates a a reLativeLY
As a resuLt of the changes made since 1979 in the ihdexation
-system, and the moderation of dsnands by marlagement and unions, the increase
.in nominaL inqomes has been sLowed down someuhat. This trend must be main-
tained in the'future :'otherqris6 the authori.ties couLd weLt be obLiged to
appLy more restrictive poLicies, in the interests of internaL and externaL
stabi Lity.
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The FederaL RepubLic of Germany enjoys reLativeLy favourabLe conditions
for a return to externaI and internat economic equiLibrium and for economic
growth, permitting, after some time, a reversaL of the faLting trend in
empLoyment. Whereas in the past there was a marked deterioration in both
the externaL position and the pubLic se.ctor accounts, with the deficits
of both generaL and the FederaL Government lleLL above pLanned LeveLs,
significant improvements are now underway. As a consequence, there should
be greater room for manoeuvre from nokt on, as the baLance. of payments can
be expected to strengthen considerabLy, and make the.major contribution
to a rate of growth avefaging over 2% in 1982 but which is foreseen to
increase as the year goes on. These deveLopments shoutd reinforce the
foundations aLready Laid for the medium term improvemerlt of economic growth
and empLoyment conditions.
0n the externaL side the significant depreciation of the DM to mid
1981 has strengthened the priCe competitiveness gf GermFn industry and a
strong expgrt performance in 1982 is expected (b voLume i.increase of 8 1/27,>t
the principaL factor putt;ng the German economy out of.the present recession.
The recent strengthen"ing of the DM, reftected in the reaLignment of EMS
centraL rates and firmness against the US-doLLar wiLL heLp to reduce the
cost of.oit and othgn imports; as a nesu[t, infLationary pressures are
expected to abate in 198? (to weLL betow 5Z) and the.defi.cit on the cunrent
account'of the balance of payments is forecast to falL from DM 24 biLLion
in 1981 to DM 7 biLLion in 1982 and couLd move into baLance towards the
end of the ye_ar: i
To boost confidence and to avoid excessive competition for scarce
funds in"the domestic capita'L markets, the Government has taken measures
to ieduce the pubLic sector deficit.
Xl These measures are designed to reduce the net borrowing requirement
of the FederaL Government for 1982 to DM 26 112 biLLion, compared with a
likeLy outturn for 1981 of'DM 34 biLtion. This improvement in the FederaL
il
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gcvirn*tntNs bsrreiling rcq*ri"o*9ntl {i :nritr{y brsnflhtl,sbout' byl,cuts in f
expenditure, tog€ther uith cuts .in tax atlouances, subsidies and transfers'
A aodest increase in taxation is also pnoposed' lJhiLe this budget poticy
' stanee is apPropriater'the adjustment in the short terru shouLd not
envisagadn ',,
n'il .
---,-ktyj furthermsre, the above adjustments to the stance ofproceed too qulc
bu.dgetaly poticy shouLd be in accordance' rrith the nen laargin for *narlo:uvre-
fo}., rcnetiry poticy odened {S by the recent appreciation of the D*flr ' Xn
ttre present circu#stanc8s, a reduction in .the bOrroning reqgiienent 3.n nnt gen€-
ratGovenn6€ntfl.oe4XofsDFin't981to5'trt47oteopin,|982carrbe
. _ 
The inprove$,perforaance'pv the pubt{c seltor ard o1 th€ exterryf. side
should give the Bundesbank 
"ore'3cope for fedllcing'interest latese rrtl{lst
naintain'ing a steqdy grorth of the pqn€y sl,lppty'in concordance uith the
:entiat output and a fErither redr.r,nlign in the rate of in-
,flation. This noutd harre a favor;rable-i*pact upon,capitat narkets in
guiope ahd i*prpvb the overaLll investc,ent-ct'iaater ,The prospects for
tor:er intenest rates *rtg be signiftcani.tf htter i-f recent goveltnse:t
decisions uith regand to rage increases in the pr|btr'c sector couLd be
bdaptd as a general guidettne by tfre'tro'sides of industny for the -next
round of rage negotiations.
- The fundanentat disruptions caused by the *ecprd oil shock sygg€st,
.:
thgt the trend late of groutlr.rhich can'eveiituatty be expected is likety,, ' 'i', '
to,Ue *lodest by pist standardslcith ur*enpl.oyaent- remaining atlreLatiiety .': ;
'high Levels, partLy because of a'donttnuing unfaryourable deaognaphic'trend
'' : '1' 
"-in thb next fer Years- :.. .
Althougil! the Fqderal ilepubtic sbares these probtens uith other ccluntries
of the European Cooaunity, the tonger tenn perforaanc€ uith regard to
gro.wth and infdatiori is stii.t f;*ety to b9 better than el"seufie^e 'a,nd thls -
coutd ue11 Lead to a grpater diver,g€nc€ in sorne ,r€spe.cts betueen Coeer'lnity '
cguntries- ilonethetess, an inproved gro$th performance fOr Gernany uou[d
cLearty be beneficiat fo1 €urope as uett and.th"is undertines,ttre 'inportance
of ,continuing tolgrapple rith the Longer tenm probtems of the T1*t#- 
=_-economy. Thus the,€nergy bitl, is l.ikety.to resain a considetabte constr"aint
{h':..
*33"*
for ssme time to cems, Furth*,r.d{vcrglfleltlon of lounqa$ 0f fRsr*y tg
reduce dependence on foreign suppl.iesr espeqiaLLy of o'iLo is theref ore
of the utmost importancer The authorities shouLd ensure a'cLear'and stabLe
environment for business and increase their efforts-to remove unceriainties
reLated to future energy investment. Energy sav'ing shouLd be further pro-
moted, but mainLy in those fieLd,s where incentives are necessary to foster
iechnical deveLopments to.be carried on by mar.ket forces once they have
entered a profit earning stage
The necessary adjustments to the industrial" structure depend upon
new investment to ensure that the capitaL stock is productiver:profitabLe
and flexibLe. AnaLysis o,f the Latest trends in the German capitaL stock
suggests that there is insufficient potentiaL for economic growth anci
empLoyment in the years ahead, and.underLine the necessity for a rapifl
adjustment both'quantitativeLy and quaLitatively. To bring about the
substantiaL growth in fixed investment requi red to : ehLarge and resiruct.;ie
the capitat stock, the main impuLse shouLd come fnom improved suppLv cc:r-
Citions. The principaL task of economy poL'icy shouLd be to improve the
generaL,regulatory framework of the economy so that it favours the aLLo-
cation of resources to investment.' In particuLanr'it is important to
remove obstacLes whichrin various areas inhibit the undertaking of new
projects. In certain casesr. however, nameLy where investment entai Ls h'igh
risks'but substantiaL externaL benefits, there- is a case for special-
structurat poLicy measures to encour,age such expenditure by industries
which are LikeLy to contribute to growth in the future. There is also a
need to'improve the generat conditions for'investment by smaLL'ancl medfum
sized companies, since these are very impontant as vehicLes for acjjustil]ent
but are often handicapped in undertaking new deveLopments-
*
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In G"rqecgr'the priority basis for the thrust of economic poLicy
nrust be the new constraints resuLting from the rapid change of the external
conditions affecting the countryrs deveLopment. These constra'ints excLude
any return to rapid rates of growth of consumption and wiLL impose a-moderate
trend of economic growth, of which exports and investment shouLd constitute
the principaL eLements.
take on a more restrictive stance in spite of.the deLay in the revivaL of
I order to achieve this object-ive, short.term economic pot'icy must
domestic dernand. In 1981 the growth rate wiLL be very Low, whereas for 198?
it is'improbabte that it wil".L exceed 2 ii, ALthough the rate of infLation
is declining sLowLy it wiLL remain excessiveLy h'igh in 1982 and wiLL
probabLy be in' excess,'o
to maintain the'rigour
20 %" In thes,e condit'ions, it seems necessary not onLy
f the incornes poticy but aLso to accompany it with
firm action to Lower the economyrs Liquidity rat'io by taking actjon both
on the pubLic deficit and on thenavaitabi[ity of credit to enterprises. In
order to achieve this, it wiLL be essentiaL to reverse the deteriorating
trend of the current baLance of the. generaL government ancl pubLic enter-
prises, not only by reducing the rate of growth of expenditure but aLso
by fighting tax evasionrby reducing the delay that has occurred in the
adjustment of certa'in pubLic sector prices, and by an overaLL increase in
the tax burden. Jhis strict management of the current operations of the
pubLic sector shouLd 
.provide some Leeway to e ontini"re and perhaps even
incnease the budgetary effort in f,avour of investment.',.In fact, this effort
appears even more ne.cessary when one considers that the strict credit
poLicy invoLving high interest rates, which is requ'ired for other reasons,
is LikeLy to produce an opposite effect. In short, the atternpt shouLd be
made in 1982 to reduce the growth of the money supply-to beLow
2A Z, which is considerably below the nominaL increase of the gnoss domestic
product. In. orcler 
-to achiev-e this, the borrowing requi rement of generat
government shouId be stabiLised at around 4 % of the gross domestic product
and the deficit ofthe other pubLic accounts - commerciaL accounts and
accounts of pubtic enterp.rises which are automaticaLLy-financed by the
CentraL Bank - shouLd ber considerabLy reduced.
?
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objectivetheeLim.inationofinfLatiqnandits.distorting9ffe9ts.Th{b
means. that the .efforts made to contain it in the short term shoutd be
extended.to a permanent action combining voLuntary Limits on the nominaL
..growth oi incomep with budgetary.rgs!figtionsrcredit Limitations and the
stabiLizing of savings. fhis/poLicy, which uLtimatety aims at re-estabIishing
the cond'itions for a rationat aLLocation of the.factors of production, does
not ruLe out the applleation of a s'tructuraL poticy tlhich' in order to meet
thd needs of rapid chqnge, tri LI have to be partiguLar[y active. The essentiaL
objectivb, uhioh'is inrposed both by the externaL constraint and regiodaL
imbaLances, must be to hasten the deveLopment, the sectoraL diversification,
and the geogr:aphical. diff,usion of industry-and to take advantage; of att the
growth potentiaL that it offers; Such a potic-y must incLude, to begin with
determined efforts to estabLish, during this initiaI phase' the required
etementS of infrastructure: in the fieLd of energy, firslty, where the
forecast rapid increase of consumption wiLL require the irltensive expLoitation
.j
of nationa['resources, but'1lso in the fieLd of transportlPnd urban infrastruc-
ture.Ina.dditionitmustin:ctudethecontirlUationofthieffortsundeq-
taken:within the framework o,f the fegionat poticy to affect sectoraI devetop-
ment wn'lcn, nowev€r,ishouLd 6asicaLLy be determined by market forces. .
The LogicaL coroLLary of a poLicy consisting of utiLising the budget in
tivity shouLd be the phasing-out. of the
seLective administrative fixing of:"interest rates appIied tO. enterprises .
untiL now, in favour of a system of uniform market ratesr-which the CentraL
Bank uouLd inftuence onl,y by using ctassicaL intervention.
*
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reduction of unempLoymento with the diminution of inequaLities of income
as a seconda.ry objective. These objdctives, are to be atta'ined by seeking
to reconciLe,a deLiberate increase in the rate of economic grobrth with a
significant reduction in the rate of infLation.
' In the short terrn, this pblicy invoLves the use of support measures
toassisttherecoVerywhi.chisbegi1nine.The'first.rneasures'takenin
earr.y-summer tv1l r'consjsted mainLy of increases in Low wages and certain
sociaL benefits, assistance to heLp firms cope with the increase in their'
.J
cbsts due to the!iffieuLt economic situationr. and a reLaxation of credit
conditions. As'a r^esqLt', and desp'ite the increase in the tax'bu'rden
- particuLarLy on high incomes - imposed by the supplem€ntary Budget of JuLy'
thepub[i.segtorfinancieLsituationw.i-LLdeter.ionate,in1981,toa
greater extent than was' previous Ly' consider.ed acceptabLe, and wh'ich 'couLd
be equivaLent to just over two perient of Eross domestic product. At i
{urther resuLt, the growth of the money s-uppLy wiLL reach 13 y" during the
Y€?r.
The poL'i:cy foreseen for 1982 wi LL seek to combine tha continuation
cif the expansionary stance - d'i rected, howeiver, towards i nvestment rather
than c.onsumption - with an exceptionaLLy Large effort to reduce'infLation,
an ob-jective which has'become even more important since the.monetary
reaLignment of 4 October 1981. Indeed, on the one hand, as the 1982
of the centraL Governm€nt incLudes a massive increase in expenditure
to measures whjch stimuLate, directLy or indirectLy, empLoyment, and
overalL tax burden wiLL remain unchanged despite the tax increases on
weatth and the, highest incomes, the potentiaL deficit 'is, Larger than
that:of1981,.evenaLLowing.forthepostponementofsomee*penditure.0n
the other hand, an increase in sogiqL security'contributions is foreseen as 
_
a means of partLyoffsetting thg strgng.growth 6f sociaL security benefits andthe
avaiLabiLity of credit to firms uiLL be maintained within Limits that are
compatibLe with the objective. of a significant redurction in the Li'quidity
ratio of the economy :
$
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wages and
i nt roduced
the aim of
This poLicy is expected to
which, combined with the favourab[e
Lead to nea L growth of gross dornesti
and to 3 'l 1n 1982. This shouLd be
ef infLation between the two years",
rate of 10 % in 1982-
addlt{on, thc prlnclpLa thf,t'thE rvcFrga grgwth, 1n'198?, of
saLanies shouLd not exceed the increase in prices, has been
and a temporary seLective price freeze has been imposed w'ith
starting the process of deceLeration.
promote a vigorous recovery of domestic demand
deveLopment of externaL demand, shouLd
c product amounting to 0.5'% in 1981
accompanied by a significant deceLeration
with the aim being to reach an annuaL
e
Ther.e ara, however, a number of unientainties surrounding this action.
FirstLy, 'it is by no means certain that the expected improvement in the-seIf-
financing capacity of firms and the budgetary tneasures in favour of business
investment, however important, wiLL be sufficient to. reverse the downward
trend in investment by.firms wh.ich couLd continue to be adverseLy affected by
a very poor initiaL financiaL situation. ALso, it is by no means certain that
domestic suppLy, wh'ich has possibLy been Limited by the weak growth of prcd-
uctive capacity over recent years, wiLL be abLe to.grow in line with demand".
There is,-therefore, a nisk that the externaL dqficit wiIL once" aga'in beg'in to
grow and that infLationary pressures wiLL remain stronger than expected. This
risk wou[d be even greater if anticipatory buying caused an unduLy rapid
recove ry i n consumpt'i on.
It seems, therefore, that the success of the'present poLicies depends
on the speed with which the counter-infLationary strategy is able to improve
the fjnanciaL situation of firms, thus'favouning an increase in'investment,
and, at the same time, to moderate the..growth of consumption" To achieve
this, it v,ritL not onty be necessary for the recentLy announced incomes po.Licy
to succeed-(without, however, abando_n.ing the principLe of price freedom beyond
the temporary 'exceptions atready made)rbut',a[so that the action taken to reduce
the Liquid'ity of the. economy shouLd extend to restricting the growth of the
money supp[y in 198? to about '13 %. This impl'ies, on the one hand, in the
framework of the chosen poLicies, that the controL of pubLic finance be
sufficientLy restrictive to Limit the general government borrowing nequirement
to about ?r5 y. of gross domestic product, in order to avold subjecting f i'rms
to a "crowding-out1'effect, and that appropriate measures be taken to stabiLise
a greater proportion of private savings
*
40.,:-
deiveLoping competitive act'ivities and, as a resutt, to increase the grouth and
the economic va[ue of employrnent,.
reversaL of tt. trend:of increasing unq$pLoyment
sharing - in order to redute its
ensure that such measurqs do not
increase.in costs
social :impact, an effort must be made to
Lead:-i,direct.ly sr indirect.ttl - to a further:
;"
..
- 
... , Lookjng beyond the recovory foraseeq for 1982r' a l€turn to faster ratesA ij.'r
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of reEnsnie Ensr4t,h rvlll, dgpsnd,on the abiltty of tha'aeonony tE aehl*v* r , Y u,'j
better adjustment to the externaL constraint, by ending the erosion by infl-ation
of its competitiVeness and by accelerating the necessary reorganisation of its
productive capacities. The eLiminatjon,of infLation requires that efforts are ' ?
made to -intfbduce a cautjous monetary. poticy, to cotJnter inftationary expectations'
and'.to reforrn, certain. structures which. enabLe firms to derive exceptionat prqfits :'t
f rotn thei r. situation.
As for structurel..,poticy, "tts aim: do not need"to b: fundament",(LV
modified. Thus, the pursuit o'f energy;saving and substitutton, uhich aims at
:
redr.rcing dependance,on ?mporres oiIr'shoutd De continued' and even lntens'ifildr
but'ryithout any maioi changes of direction. S,imitarty, infustr'ia't, Fgligy shou[d'
in the rnain, be based on rnarket torces, rn co.nrofinity with the competit'ion poLicy
of the Community. Any generat measures in f,avour of investment or research, any
' :-
speic,ific measur€s designed to reorganise sectors in difficuLty_or to promote
high technoLogy sectors, and the new faciLities prorrided to remedy tinanliat
deficiencies and to're$ove obstactes to the devetopment of smatL and Bedium=
, ;,slzed tlrms, snoutd atL be-contained within this framew6rk-
, 
. 
. At the sblne time, inportant effortrs's.hputd be ma,de in the arqa'of
plofessionat trajning in 'ordgr to echieve greater harmoriy betreeen quatifications
and expected future needs and, in so do-ing, to itnprove the prospects of
i : . Essentiatty, a durabte
is dependent oir the succesS of
i s taken to reduce unemPLoYment
aLL these measures. To the extent that action
directty - generatl'y by various means of uork-
.L
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In l-relgl4,over the years the main thlust of economic poLicy has been t
touar.dtheindtjstriatisation.oftheeconomy,diVersifying.itss.tructufe
' ! 'ustries' To encourage thisaway. frrom agrictrtture and other traditionat i1O1
;;":.r. 
"url"rriu" gou".nmeirts rrave taid 
great emphasis on attracting foreign
dir.ec.t {nvebtrngflt and undertaking publicall.y,sponso'red infrast,ructure inveqttngnt?
ftie fruits of tnis pot icy have,been:evident in a r:!€ of'OroUtf of lr:ish bxPort3
uetl in excess of the rate of grourth of uorld trade. fne opehness of the
.a
Irish economy does however make it'extremety vutnerabte to do!"nturns. in wortd
eiorlonric activity and to inter:rtationat inftationary deveLoFrnentg sugh- as
I
.j
occuired in the wake of the second oi[ shock. The ambitious pubtic capital i
pqogramme' hr, aLr.lays imptied retativety Large government def i cits but the
,internationaL recession coupLed with discretionary government action has Led .
to a significant widening of these deficits and to a serious imbatance on
;.;";;:;;;;;';;;;;;;.' 
"';;'-;;;;";;on has been aggravated Qr a retativptv , 
" 
'
poor inftation performance wnlcn 1s arrecrrrl9 L
The pot.,icy problems facing' t.he au]hsrities iare.the red'uction'of, lhe bat-9nce of '.'-'
p€y$elts and governdents deficits, the controt of injlation and-the maintenancu ',,:.. ..../.
oftheGovernmerit|.svigoro.usro[eincapiqatformation..:
i. .'
. r t ' i !L- extefnat balance- .' ::
-,Anessentja|donditionforachieving-animprqvementintne
"n6,fo. moderatins domestig 
inf tatlonali qiesiurel'!s tft }l".:tt o:""::*entl-.,'
r;rot !e attowed to add.excessi.Vety 'to the Levet of ''deaand' To'this end the' '' ''l
mon€taryauthorities.havea4nounceda|'im.itof15'lgrowthinpriv-bteseqtof..._r.,__l-, _ __
credit extended by Licensed banks in the year to mid-February 198?' Given an'
;";;.;"; 
'"ui" ot g.ob,tir of nominal' cDP 
in excess of 19 z iii ca{ender.t*:" 198J ''
thj,s tafget see{ns consisltent ujth lthe tneed to 
"*"ri'a- m€asure 
pf rest,ra'int 
.9n
:t'
. 
domestic demand. Success 'in meeting,'this target uiIt however lnainty deBeird 
': ;
'' t 
-;.
on tne errecE of the Large government deficit on credit creation and the..attttu*,
of the authorities to rising domestic interest rates'' A cejting'on cred{t ,.','
' L -' --'t - te for 1982 uhengrowth slmrrar to that in force for 1981 tloutd seem approprla
nominat.6DPis,expectedtogro',l]byabout?1.g..
..\
,unt.it;thefirstoitshockthepubti1se1tor'defi:l:-l:::"oo''nanttyon
account of capitaL expenditure undertaken by the pubIic sector' In the most
recentyearshouever,'a9ign'ificantimba|anqeheaiemerg}dinttecurrent
*account of the budget. Tl:is has res"iLted partLy f rom the work'ing o'i automat'ic
siabjljsers, paftly frc.m d'iscreticnary g,avernment action and partLy from'the
LeveL of pay setrlements in the pubIii sector, This overaLi- deficjt is n$t
unreLared to the serious baLance of payrirents'imbaLance' which is expeciecj
to reach ,i4,g % o"f GDp in 1981 . in adclit$on, the demands of the current
budget threaten tlo ciivei-t resoLlrces aiiia)d f rorn the capit;rL br":dget "' t4oreover
the buit-ri-up in debt concomitant with'the def icits is neducing the government'$
e and is Plaeingrocm for nrarroeuvre in deating uith the cLirrent buriget imbalanc
a heavy burden on futc,rre fax payers. A rever$&1" in .the trend to increased
a i- l-y those on account of curren'c 2;tems j s ovendue ancJ
1.ec,ui].es f i;'m governfienLaction wh'ich shouLd incLude b+th erpenCitur^e
reduc{:'ions anci tax increases- The corFeetive package intrr:clr;eed in JuLy $y
the inrominQ g{,veffimentr-after anLy one month in af!'ice, t0 prevent a
further det*ri.cralion in ihe i$81 situation is an irTrFortant step in this '
1-, 
---\ :^ {1101dir*ctjr:n* This poLicy stance shouLsi ile ne'inforeed in"i982 ss as to rerJuce
tfre [xcf,equer Eorrowing Requiren]ent to below 13't at 6t'?" At the same tirne
rhe cirrrenr budget de'f i ci'; shoulcl f atL to a LeveL equ'ivaLent i:O opproximateLy
6 % Of Gpi?- This wouLcl be 'irr L ine !,lith the Governfie rrt'6 s cclmrnitment to eL'iminate
the currr-'rlt huci$et def i cit over a four year p'erioci''
Tr:,re oFenness Qf the eccln(Jruy to high'internatiorraL infLat'ion, the advers'e
movements jn the,term$ of tracje "foLLowing the second oiL nrife shcck/ the Lack
of sr:ffiqien{ rnoderation in wage barEain'ing and the ciefieit financing ihave Led:f r:f i'iSi t 'looeraio an infLatlon ratel rldl lerr t.drs rivate consunlptionoe.iJ"mince f"r oui of Ljne r+ith the Community average: tl'ie p
defLator is expected to increase by ?A % ]n 1981" If the economy is to
maintain its competitive position it is essenti;L that this rate of infLation
is quickLy moderateci. This lequires that domestic costs are heLd down' To
th.is end, the government can have a majOr influence on the Level of settLernents
in thecoming payround through.its attitude to the pubLic sector uhere about
one fifth of aLL empLoyees are employed"'
ii-
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ITALY
ln ItaLyz economic policy is domindted by-the determination to bring
infLat{On under controL. Rampant {nfLat{on ovor fiany yeans h{f nqt enlt
been a permanent factor of short term instabiLity and exchange rate voLa-
tiLity, but aLso of, resource misaLLocation.
This anti-infLationary stance became more positive in 1981, and was
supponted by the Commission Recommendation of 1 JuLy 1981 on the occasion
of the ItaLian Governmentrs recourse to the safeEuard cLause provided for
ih ArticLe 109 of the Treaty.' It has resuLted in a tighter credit poLicy,
in decisions of principLe (not, however, fuLLy impLemented) to hoLd down
the underLying pubLic sector deficit, in a concerted attempt to stab'iLize
consumer prices and in the opening of manaEement-un,ion negotiations to
bring about changes in the wage indexation mechanism. 
'
The monetary realignment of 4 October 1981 is a further reason why
this new course of economic policy aLL its aspects shoutd be transLated
into action as quickLy as poSsibfe. The cycLicaL background wi'LL be favou-
rabLe: buoyant export demand, a moderate upturn in domestic demand and the
probabLe confirmation of a sLower movement of prices. Thus, after faLLing
back sLight!v in 1981, gross domestic product is LikeLy.to register a rise
of close on 2 % for 1982, whiLe the rate of price rises is Likely to fa[L
spgntaneousLy beLow 17 %. This is a propitious background for the definitive
introduction of the proposed anti-infLation package which, within two years,
shoutd bring inf Lation down to cLose to the average rate prevai L'ing 'in
trading partner countfies and'at the same time keep the economy on its
medium-term potentiat growth trend.
The keynote bf economic policy for 1982 must, and moreover can be,
the resoLute reduction of infLation; conseguentLy, the cruciaL objectives
.1.
'l
ir; .ir
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r
t
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are monerary srri,ctness. and the decel.enation of costs; These objegt,ives must '
be pursued simuLtaneous[y. Efforts must be mdde to bring down furth€r the--"'-"
economy!s Liquidity ratio, by achieving both a.. furthen ret'ative cont'raction {n
overaLt tending and'a further reduction i,n the degree of Liquidity pf fi,nanciat
fr;\::t';
,$
iit
:{
'*'I
savings. The greatest probtem wiLL be to Limit the pubtic deficit - to a Level
of LIT 50 000 biLLion fgr the ne! borrowing of.the pubtic gector (br.oad definit- q.
ion) and .to some 9 7l of gross domestic product fol the generaL government. :
t'
borrouingrequirement.but.thj'sisessentiaLifthecreditcon.str-aintsonfirms
are not to be unduly, sever.e. -The ajm of budget management in 1982 fust therefore
t' '\ r- ?' 
-esources and in pa.rticutar to cut spending), for if budbet voLumesoe to Tree new r
ar'eLeff:todeveLo'pgpontaneousLy,thispbjectiveuou|.dbeexceedec.byfar.But
'-.'.the Long moirths of e'ffort to brea( the vicious circte of price and.cost increases ',
musr, on rnelr side, atso produce dqcisive resuLts. This wouLd be.achieved if,
as d i'e.sutt of the success of governnent steps designed to stow consumer price r,ises
downfurther,moderationprevaitsintherenewaLofthenumerousandjmportantpay
agreements expiring at the end of 1981 and ifr secon{ty, the parti6s concerned reach
agreement in their efforts to make the rigid sLiding scaLe rnechanism more fLexibte.
.
permanent arrangetients must,be made. in future to reduce sharp[y the extent to r.rhich
. 
" - -: enitsfLiquidity is fed by the pubLic sector deficit-: in the past, the Latter has !"9
main source. Two types of action are-req,i.rired' : the form". .ono".ns the financidii s1,.-
' -. ilr' '
the deficitr. the Latter the defici:t itseLf. lFor the former, the Tr'easuiyrs caIts "
on the rnar.ket,must be Limited by graduatLy transforming - th-i:s is now bgi'ng done -
the tieasury into the role of banker of 
.the publi:c secior; further, stopping auto- ,'' '
l
matic interVentions.by the centraL bank at the alctjons of'pubLi,c aecurities must ',
tead to better 
-controt of .the monetary- base. A9,for the defiqit itseLj, the need
to check its growth impLies an effort aLL the more energetic, since it wiLL have
to concentrate on the current baLance' rt wouLd $mply' in paFtircutarT a'better ' 't:
:;
controL of the operating costs of pubLic administration and pubtic sector s6rv'ices,
the requirement to bring into equiLjbrium certain pubLic sector operations that
are in struct"uraL deficit'- the heaLth service and pension fund, primariLy - and
-r--:-changingthesystemofautomatictransfersfromcentraLgovernmenttaxreceipts
to regionaL and tocaL authorities, and the re-introduction of taxes for their benefit.
$
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The other anti-infLationary moves whjch are nacesaary, sueh as Lhe
-
? s{.{rn{nmt{en ef the nuLes and cuctoms whJ ch fal L heavl Ly upon dJ srrJbut jen ,si1d
construction costs amongst others, reLate to suppLy side_poLicy, and, hence
to aIL the measures suited to hastening 
-the acJjustment of structures of produc-
tion to the requirements of a-competitjve economy.
The most necessary and urgent of these moves concerns energy, where,
as a resuLt of deLays in introducing a systematic policy of saving and substit-
ution, the situation is one of stitL extremeLy high dependence on imported o'iL.
A vigorous effort wiLL have to be made during the next few-years toiuards conser-
vationr the promotion of nationaL sources ot" energy ancl nucLear prociuction, and
the conversion to coaL" Other effects on the structuraL.side wiLL be necessary
to heLp further the remodeLLing of industry, to bring about a shift in its centre
of gravir:y from traditionaL manufac'Luring irrdustries and heavy irrdustry, often
badl.v affected by intei'nationaL cornpetition, towards h:igh technoLogy industries
with a high veLue added csntent, which ought to deveLop a more necessariLy
favourabLe baLance of tracie. In addit'ion, steps shouLd be taken towards ensur.ing
the better expLoitation of agric-uLturaL and tourist potentiaL. Lastly. the streng-
thening of structures of production requ'ires increased efforts to improve the
environment Lrithin which enterprises operate. They shouLd aimr'in particuLar, at
greater effic'iency in pubLic services/, at a wider participation by the southern
regions in the generaL effort towards adjusting structures of production, and at
a more sat'isfactory matching of professional training to requirements. r
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SgE gross d.onestic product feII by about 3 /o in LgBl-
a,ad. corrld. again d-ecrease in 1pB2 entailing a w6rsening of the enplo;nnent
situation bihiih r:ntil now has rema;ined reasonable' As a nesuLt, ind'ustrial
rest:lcturi-rg ar.d. the iieed. to keep produci;ion costs as iow as poss:bIe
has beconie more r.rrgento In this regand', the application of the agreenent
concl-uded. last l,lay by the social partr:'ers, lvhich, in particularn entaiLs
a more fLexible applicatioh of the ,systern of indexatioil, should make a
significa.rrt contribution; this doveS-oprcent seebs especialJ.y oppor'cqre i4
view of the recent accelera-Lio:r of the increa,se in consuner prices"
The strictqr expend.iture poJ.icy sdt out in the d.raft bud.get fori
1!82 should. ainr at securing a rrargin of manroeuvre necessaly fo-r
ind.ustrj.al" restrtcturjig aed. shorl.Ld. ayoid. an increase in the ta.:c burd-en"
,Inat inplies not exceed.ing the liloit fixed" for the net d'eficit in the
Statesr bud.get ('ar5 tirrilo r""n.s or 11 9 {" ot GTP).
,,.. 
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For the Netherlands, the forecasts for 1!82 show an i.nprovenent in
the econonic situa,tion reLative to that in nost other Comnunity corrntri.es.
gutput resqpes an upwa^r"'d pathl while the rate of infLation'renains relatively
mod.erate. fhe cunnen_! baLance lof payments surplus, smaLL in 1981 , cou[d reach
about 2.2 % of GDP in 198?, LargeLy as a nesuLt of an increase in the price
of exported gas
Eow6ver, this encorragi.ng trend. hid,es e, less favourable outlook for
the rued.iq.n tenol officiaL projections show a gror,ith rate of only 1 f" in' We
between L9B1-and 1985.
[he Dutch authorities are therefore concerned to consoLidate the
conpetitive position of the dconomy. llhe aohievement of this objective
d.epend.s on a chang" i,ro inclustrial stnrcture resuLting, iu'particuJ.ar, in a
lejss intensi.ve demand. for enerry, bearing in nind. the levelIiag off of
natural gas prod.uction in the Ll8Ots.
It also rests on continued. wage restraint both to red.uce prod.uction'
costs and. to engure the profitability of the investnents necessary to adapt
the inclustrial structure.
the realignrnent of the central rates of the European Monetary
Systern, agr6ed. upon on the 4 Qctober 1p81, grving a.n effective appreciation of the
guiLder of 3,5 % against the members participating in the exchange rate mechanism,
,ihouLd. cont.ri bute to- !hi s/obje-ot1vu tn"ori$ trof,iin6 doniu import costs, through the beneficiaL ini:act of
the inprovenent of the terns of trade on real incomes and througlr the en-
ha^nced. possibilities for a reduction in interest rateso
A final elenent of the stratery which seelcs to support the colr4peti-
en and' to reduce the bud.gettive position is to stabil"ise the fiscal burd,
deficit" The 1982 d.raft State Bud.get, published. in Septenber, which shows a
red.uction in the General Covernment borrowing reguirenent from 7 3/q 'h at
national incone in 1981 to 6 L/2 /o ln 1982? has beeri d.rarrn up with this ain
,*
.-^-in qincl. It csntains subetastial.econoqies, notablSr'on sociaL wclfare
pis&flntr1 pi,rrLl mnrstl'prF, oa* pu.blto haalt!" s
The inrplementation' of budgetany and,financiaL po[icies irr 1982 shoutd
take a,ccount of, the repercussiong of the reali_gneent on the'4 Ootoler. i,
I
.A re&re*ion i:a the,bud,gpt detricit, sucb as iad,lcated above, d;69s not. ..
elili.na-te the daagers of il'flationary finaJrci?,g a.ud. na.intains the tax {}
btrnAen nn tfre $etherlends at : one of the "higirest levels in E\Eoper .. tbe
rrors@fu1grrneupl'qr'nentsituatiorrre1r'hq*everreq4ireEe1ectireEG€!a[F€Sr
1
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Ihe Level of output in the Unite4 Kingdom econony is notl shoning
stabi:[isinE, rl1ith 6DP having faLten by nearLy 6% since the second hatf
of 1979.. ,TbtaL'Industria! output feLL by over 14Y. between mid-1979 and
mid-1981. PartLy asla resuLt of this'fatL there has"been a rapid rise
in th'e [eveL- of ungmp[oyrnent which.now stands at nore than'11"/' of the
rr hand, there has been a marked faLL in
theunderLyingrateofinftationwhichhasmoreor[esshaLvedsince
1 980.
cipated f.or the Community as a 'whot.e, depends lreavi if on the t"eversaL'cif
the.stsck-bui,Lding cycte but the recent depleciation of sterLing wi Lt.
ts. More-he'tp sustain.the momentum of any rgcovery by stimulating . exPot"'
over, despite this depreciation the rate of infLation in 1982 can be
expec,ted to decline furthe'r, aLthough it is Likel'y to remain in doubtet.t''
f i gnrres.
been the controL of doneltic. infLation. This end has bepn sought through
monetary and fiscat controt within the framew6rk of a. Medium'Term Finqncial'
.stra.tegi (MTFS) which requires that pubLic elpendituce and pubtic sector
bor,rowing, as a percentage of GDPr. shouLd be'reduied over. the mediun .term.
..ALthoughinadoptingthisstrategyaccountwastakenofthe
difficutties that it wouLd bring jn the shortei term, it is cLear thgt
the rrige in unempLoyment has been far g'reater and tonger Lived th..an anti-
.cipated. As a consequencer'in formuLating poLi'cy two considerations.
must.be kept in mifid. 0n the one hand, there is the need to ens.ure the
iontroI of:' inf Lat'ionary pressures and the stabi Lity of f inanciaL markef s'
0n the o'ther hand, a cLear strat€gy shqutd, be impLemented to improve tle
productive capac'ity o,f the economy and to at[eviate, the sOciaL costs of
.the adjustment process, particuLai[y the difficutties on the Labour market.
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Measures of the kind announced- ln June to lncrease youth empLoyment and
training are a step in this direction.
. Thelpresent fiscaI stance shouLd ensure that the iubLic'sector
Borrowing Requirerrent (PSBR) outturn f or 1981-82 wi LL be broadLy 'in Line
gufe of UKL 10 5OO miLtion, a substantiaL faLL in a single
year. Indeed, as a proportion of GDP, the PSBR in 1981-82 is LikeLy to
faLf to 4n34r,compared to'6'A in.the previous financiaL year' The growth
of sterLing M3, however, is LikeLy'to be somewhat outside the tatget range
ot 6t% . 10'1. '
For 1982- 83, the authorities present intentions are that the
pSBR wiLL faLL somewhat- in absoLute terms, towards the trend VaLue set
out in the MTFS (3rZ % of GDP). PubLic finance pLbns shouLd give greater
priority to the foLLowing areas :
to expand the speciaL empLoyment measures;
- to reduce the empLoyerst N"lignaL Insurance surcharg'e,
t hus Ldwer i ng -emp Loyment cost sr' or
- bring forward 'worthwhiLe investment pnojects.
Possibte additionaL expenditure (or reduced income) corresponding
to an 'increase in the PSBR beyond its trend vaLue (3rZ y" of GDP) shouLd
aLso be attributed to these sectors
The prbposed faLL in the PSBR between 1981-SZ and 1982-83
as a percentage of GDP shoVld not be inconstent with a target grow'th
a
rite of 5 - 9% for ste,rLing lvl3 in 1982-83, though this might impLv a
.higher interest rate structure than rnight otherwi'se be the case.
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i.l
poLicy cao slake totlards
the authorities keeP a
f ac'lLi,tate tlre overaI t
Government rS abi ti.ty, 1e
.t
cunrent diffi cuLties.
the contributlon which such a stancE of fiscat
reducing earnings growth, it is important that
f i'rra grip'on.pubtic sector. pay rises. This r.rould
contt:oL of pubfic-expqndtture and i,ncrease the
take steps; as outtined.abover.'to.deaI with the
Atthough the recent marked downward novement in the.vaLue of 
,
sterLing witt have improved th.e competitiveness of UK.industry, the main
.' :
aim of economic policy is to reduce the rate of infLation; this suggests
the need for exchange rate stabiLity from noH on. The UK authorities,
shoutd therefore consider the,poss]bil,itl ofradopting a target fange !o,
bte,rling.. $rith the improved budgetary position and an underLyin$ rate of'
!l
-cost anq prtce inf Lation wh-ich no,Longer d'iver.ges greatLy from that of ,-the ':. 
.:,
,Comm.ulity average, bdth the credibitjty qf such p policy and the means fo.r:
' '. :
its'imp[ernentalion wouLd be assjst.ed by the adheren,ce of gter[ing i'nto thq'
exchange..ratemeqhan-ismoftheEqropeanmonetary,.system.t-.'.
, 
. 
l, .:. 
,_
' t ..
. 
: 
' The,fierce gompetjtive pressures to whi.ch the UK has recentty,Uben
subjected have undoubtedLy provoked,gubstantiaL,improvenents,..in'e'fficiency"r,
NsnetheLess; much,rema'ins to be done ,to overiome t,he Longer,'ter.m structuraL
idifficuLties of the Biitish economy. In,,particuLar the UK stiLL,suffers .
from: , 
. r:-.r :...
"- r€Lativety high LeveLs of reat uagesr:, tow labour productivity and, ,'.,'.' '
.t -
Low profitabi tity;
..:at6wLevel-ofproductiveinvestmeot;],
..1
- an inadequateLy cbmrietitive production structure
the rates obtaining in other major.industriaLised countries, and by ma'in-
i:taining, and i,rnpr.oving upon, the gains in productivity aLready made, the
Uk shouLd be ab!e. to incr-ease, sienificantLy invest*ent p.ofitabi Lity' both
in absoLute terms, and in compgrison to othen countries. 'At the same.time
there would be a strengthening in the competitiveness of UK exports.
{5
ill.i
.t.
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* Greater investment profitabiLity and jmproved export competitiveness
shouLd then'provide the stimuLi for the investrnent needed to increase
tabour productiv'ity further and to effect the Longer term-changes in
. 
industrial structure. This inturn wouLd lead to a Longer term improvement
in the UK growth and empLoyment prospects.
However, th'is process requires a major change in the composition
of nationaL income, with a reduced Labour share but increased profits.
This itself would be a refLection of a necessary shift of."uorrr.. away
from consurnption, which has risen rapidLy over the Last few years/ to-
wards investment and exports
+
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Tabte 13
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I pr.ilnlmry aldmaic o{ li. Colnmirsioa |.wIC- on U|. b.|b Ol pro|'dt c.' atfrdpafad 99lld-.2 % enangc oyar gtcYi,ov' parlod' rnnual rata.I uK nrti6o.t rocicnt o!dr.
. Stsrling M3.
In 1979 sfr lgoo trc rrass1c. co.rcprning tho inonsy ruppry ar. diliort d by r rr-irrrmc ol E'rr 'oond' oo.*rola lrd br ttrdr lppslon h dGlo' i ss' dbbn'ot"t'
cor.c1od tho grpivt rala. woulo,b. about 14,0% In 1070 md ln 1980.
Note :" F is unLess otherwise. stated.
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- The indu'striaLized countries, aLmost without eXception, have
been hit by structuraL s'hifts in the worLd eocnomyi by the consequences
of the two oiL pnice shocks, interest rate and exchange nate instabiLity
and pubLic budgets and baLance of payments disequiLibria. IndustriaLized
and deveLoping countries aLike are in the throes of a painfuL and contin-
uing adjustment crisis.
- But some, industriaLized countnies, such as the USA and in parti-
cuLar Japan, have been.more successfut in coping with the adjustment
constraints of the seventies. From 1974 to 1980 the USA has increased
totaL empLoyment by 12 miLLion persons, whereas fon the Commun'ity, the
increase t.tas a mere 118 thousanA. Aecause of her competitiveness and
dynamic appfoach to exporting, Japanrs economy has sjnce 1976 gnown by
5r3 % a yean. Both the USA and Japan have recentLy been back in.surpLus
on their current accounts (see TabLe 14). .
0n top of this adjustment cnisis. has come t:he recession caused .
by the second oit price rise and the doLLarts instabiLity. It has been
more intractable for Europe and has infLicted more damage on the Eunopean
economies than on Japan and the USA. In 1981, reaL gross domestic product
for the Community as a whoLe wiLL contract sLightLy. FrOm eanLy 1980
untiL today, the number of negistered unempLoyed in the Community has
cLimbed by some 3 miLLion to over 9 mjLLion, over 8 % of the Labour force-
Successes in hoLding down infLation have remained rnodest, with cost and
g between the member countries- BaLance
of,payments deficits and inierest rates are at recond LeveLs.
The bus'iness cycLe is now tunning for the better in Europe. The
chaLLenge to the Community is to ensune that the moderate recoveny no-w in
prospect for 198? is deveLoped into a period of sustained growth and
stabiLity which creates new jobs and neduces unempLoyment in a cLimate of
Low inf Lation. But th is e.xpont-Led recovery rema'ins f ragi Le and depends
on the optimaL intenactjon of a favourabLe expanslon of worLd trade, jmp-
roved and sustained competitiveness in the Member Stafes and decLining
interest nates. It shouLd be reinforced domest'icaLLy by improved corpon:te
profitabiLity, mope'effective incentive schemes and the epsier avaiLabiLjty
of capjtdL to'encouPage investment and faciL-itate the renewaL and
restructuring of productive capacity in Europe
'*
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for On{nging down'{ntercst rates and easing monetary faEtrf'lnt. If th!
,, a t-, _.:
Cornmunity wishes to take advantage of expanding exterf|raL'demand, aLL tende
oies'toward greater protectionissr should Ue firmLy checked. To the extent
that some possibitities eXist for a seLective support of dem'a.nd, this must
be used in a.reas *h"." manpower and pnoduction faciLities are avaiLabLe
.'.
and whene the direct impact on the balance of payments is sL'ight.
#
n?'
t
.:
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ti
The reaLignrpent of. centraL rates in the EI{S on 4 0ctober is a new
point of reference for the'management of econgmic pot'icy in thd period ahead-
In'itseLf the reaLignment r",as a-act of sound management, conf irming that
the System can adj'ust without Letting Loose erratic or ovenshootihg exchange
rate movements among participants, '.However, it aLso underIines. the need
fon renewed and strongen efforts to achieve convergence in cost develop:
ments and in. budgetary and domestic-monetary poLicies. I1 addition, the
reaLtgnmenr rtself warrants intennaL poticy adjustmentsz on the one h'and
fon.stricter pqLicies fon controL of pubL'ic defi:cits and costs in devaL*
uing courttni.es/ and on. the other hand for measures'-to support activity in
revaLuing countries, notabLy through an easing of interest rates. On the
basis .of beitter convergence and coordination'of poticy a.Long these Lines,
the Community wi['L be_ in a position to strengthen the EMS, which forms an
essentiaL eLemeht in the spectrum of poIicies required to turn the recovery
into a beriod of .sustained and stabLe grwoth.
The improved out[ook and probabLe
short of what is needed either to reverse
absorb the ,increased supBLy of Laboun, or
ness and poticy errors which Left'Europe
inock waves that h'ave passed through the
performance 'in 1982 f aL L f ar
the trgnd of unempLoYment and
to make good the economic wqak-
i L t-defended against ,thd major
worLd edonomy.
The need is for: more ridjcaL-and fundamentaL changes in, the macno-
economic management of pubLic budgets, in sectoraL adjustments and in 
:
the behaviour of sociaL partnens, Oun experience with'in the Community and
outside show that these.enormous economic adjustments are possibLe, and
indeed ca.n be crowned with success as Long as the fundamentaL economii
i
poLicy choices are cornectLy set.
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Propobat for a
COUNCIL DECISION
adopting the annuaL report on the econom'ic situation in the Community
and Laying rjown economi c poli cy guideLines for 1982
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES.
HAVing regard to the Treaty estabL'ishirrg the European Economic Community,
Hav'ing regard to Councjl Decision 711t20/EEC of 18 February 1974 on the
attainment of a high cjegree of convergence of the economic poLicies of
the Member States of the European Economjc Community (1), as amended by
Decision 75 /787 /EEC (2), and in particular Art'icLe 4 thereof,
Having regard to the proposaL from the Commission,
Having reganrl to the opinion of the European Parliament (3),
Having regand to the opinion of the Economic and SociaL Committee (Q,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:
ArticLe 1
The CouncjL hereby adopts the annuaL report on the economic situation 
"in
the Community (1981), contained in sect.ion I of the Annex lioint 2 of the
draft Repor!7, and Lays down the. guidelines to be foLLowed by the Member
States in economic poLicy for 1982, as contained in sect'ions II, III and
IV of the Annex lFoints 3,'4 and 5 of the draft Report/.
t.
. ATT'ICLC Z
This Dec'ision is adnessed to the Member States.
Done at BrusseLs, 1981
For the Counci I
The Pres i dent
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631 5.3.197t+, P. 16
330, 24.12.1975, p. 52
